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Non-Technical Summary
While there are numerous studies on the measurement of the technical or cost efficiency of
local governments, the analysis of the main drivers of this efficiency has attracted far less
attention in this literature. However, information about the main sources of (in)efficiency
are not unimportant, since they can provide useful information for (local) policy-makers.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to add to the existing literature by studying the deter-
minants of local governments’ efficiency. For this purpose we focus on one particular area of
public goods provision, namely the construction and maintenance of (county) roads, instead
of the local government as a whole. This avoids, at least to a certain degree, the problem of
defining a comprehensive set of reasonable input and output indicators fully describing local
governments’ activities, and therefore reduces potential sources of measurement errors.
Our empirical analysis is based on a broad panel of German counties rather than a cross-
section used in the most previous studies which investigated the determinants of efficiency.
The German counties are an interesting case to study, since one of the main tasks of these
counties is the construction and maintenance of county roads. In order to determine the
main drivers of efficiency in road maintenance, we first calculate efficiency indices using
non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis) and parametric (stochastic frontier analysis)
estimation techniques. In a second step, we examine how these efficiency indices can be
explained by a number of exogenous (e.g. socio-economic, fiscal, political) variables. More
specifically, we apply and compare four different estimation approaches to detect the poten-
tial sources of (in)efficiency. This broad variety of estimation approaches allows us to test
and check the robustness of the derived results.
The results of our analysis show that (controlling for numerous characteristics of the coun-
ties) the disposable income of the counties’ citizens, intergovernmental grants for county
roads, and the payments to the counties influence technical efficiency negatively. For the
political variables we find weak evidence that efficiency decreases with an increasing share
of seats of left-wing parties in the county council; on the other hand, the hypothesis that
efficiency decreases with the degree of political concentration in the county council could not
be confirmed. Moreover, the analysis shows that not all of the four estimation approaches
are consistent – concerning the sign of the coefficients as well as the (statistical) significance.
Therefore, focusing on just one estimation method, as it was done in the most previous
studies investigating the determinants of local governments’ efficiency, may be deceptive.
To test the robustness of the results, different estimation approaches should be applied and
compared.
Zusammenfassung
In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten hat sich ein Literaturstrang herausgebildet, der sich mit
der Messung der technischen Effizienz des o¨ffentlichen Sektors bescha¨ftigt. Hierbei wurde
sowohl die Effizienz von Teilbereichen des o¨ffentlichen Sektors, wie beispielsweise Schulen
oder Krankenha¨user, als auch die Gesamteffizienz von (lokalen) Gebietsko¨rperschaften, wie
beispielsweise Kommunen, untersucht. Einen eher geringeren Stellenwert in diesem Lite-
raturstrang hat bisher jedoch das Versta¨ndnis fu¨r die Bestimmungsfaktoren dieser tech-
nischen Effizienz erfahren. Informationen u¨ber die Hauptquellen von potenziellen Ineffizien-
zen im o¨ffentlichen Sektor ko¨nnen aber sehr nu¨tzlich sein, da sie hilfreiche Anhaltspunkte fu¨r
Politiker oder Amtsinhaber liefern, wie potenzielle Ineffizienzen eingeda¨mmt werden ko¨nnten.
Aus diesem Grund stellt dieser Beitrag den Versuch dar, diese Lu¨cke zu schließen. Um poten-
zielle Messfehler bei der Bestimmung von Input- und Outputindikatoren zu minimieren,
werden dabei nicht die Gebietsko¨rperschaften als Ganzes herangezogen, sondern nur ein
ausgewa¨hlter wichtiger Teilbereich des o¨ffentlichen Sektors, na¨mlich die Bereitstellung und
Instandhaltung von Straßen.
Im Gegensatz zu zahlreichen Vorga¨ngerstudien, welche die Determinanten der technischen
Effizienz des o¨ffentlichen Sektors in einer Querschnittsanalyse untersucht haben, basiert die
empirische Analyse der vorliegenden Studie auf einem umfangreichen Panel von deutschen
(baden-wu¨rttembergischen) Stadt- und Landkreisen. Diese eignen sich hierfu¨r besonders
gut, da eine der Hauptaufgaben der Stadt- und Landkreise die Bereitstellung und Instand-
haltung von Kreisstraßen darstellt. Um nun die Hauptbestimmungsfaktoren der Effizienz im
kommunalen Straßenbau zu analysieren, werden in einem ersten Schritt – mithilfe von nicht-
parametrischen (Data Envelopment Analysis) und parametrischen (stochastic frontier anal-
ysis) Scha¨tzverfahren – zuna¨chst Effizienzindikatoren berechnet. Nach der Ermittlung der
Effizienzindikatoren wird anschließend in einem weiteren Schritt untersucht, welche Faktoren
(z.B. sozioo¨konomische, fiskalische oder politische Variablen) die Effizienz beeinflussen. Hier-
fu¨r werden vier unterschiedliche Scha¨tzverfahren (Regressionsanalysen) herangezogen. Die
Anwendung unterschiedlicher Regressionstechniken ermo¨glicht es, die hergeleiteten Ergeb-
nisse zu vergleichen und einem Robustheitstest zu unterziehen.
Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Analyse zeigen, dass – bei gleichzeitiger Kontrolle fu¨r die un-
terschiedlichen Charakteristika der Stadt- und Landkreise – die Effizienz mit dem verfu¨gbaren
Einkommen der Bu¨rger eines Kreises, der Kreisumlage bzw. den Gewerbesteuereinnahmen
sowie den Finanzzuweisungen fu¨r die Kreisstraßen sinkt. Was den Einfluss von politischen
Variablen auf die Effizienz angeht, kann die Hypothese nicht besta¨tigt werden, dass die Ef-
fizienz mit zunehmendem politischem Wettbewerb (im Kreistag) steigt. Auf der anderen
Seite deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Kreise mit einem ho¨heren Sitzanteil von linken
Parteien im Kreistag ein geringeres Effizienzniveau aufweisen. Daru¨ber hinaus zeigt die
Analyse, dass die Ergebnisse der vier unterschiedlichen Regressionsverfahren im Hinblick auf
die Vorzeichen der Koeffizienten sowie auf die (statistische) Signifikanz nicht immer korres-
pondieren. Die Fokussierung auf nur ein Scha¨tzverfahren, wie es in der vergangenen Literatur
ha¨ufig der Fall war, kann daher zu fehlerhaften Interpretationen fu¨hren; bei Effizienzanalysen
sollten zur U¨berpru¨fung der Robustheit der Ergebnisse immer Verfahren verglichen werden,
die auf unterschiedlichen Scha¨tzansa¨tzen basieren.
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1 Introduction
The measurement of the performance or efficiency of the public sector has received increasing
attention in recent years. One reason for this is that the provision of public goods and services
by (local) governments requires funding. Often these funds derive - directly or indirectly
- from taxation. Since the citizens of (local) jurisdictions have to pay these taxes, they
are interested in an efficient provision of the public goods and services, that is, they want
the (local) government to provide as many public goods as possible for a given amount of
(fiscal) costs. While there are numerous studies on the measurement of (local) governments’
(technical) efficiency (for a review see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens, 2000 and Worthington
and Dollery, 2000), the analysis of the main drivers of this efficiency has attracted far less
attention in this literature.1 Information about the main sources of efficiency, however, are
not unimportant, since they can “provide useful information to policy-makers” (De Borger
and Kerstens, 1996a, p. 147). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to add to the existing
literature by studying the determinants of efficiency for a broad panel of German counties.
For this purpose we focus on one particular area of local public good provision, namely
road maintenance, instead of the local government as a whole. This avoids, at least to a
certain degree, the problem of defining a comprehensive set of reasonable input and output
indicators fully describing local governments’ activities.
Despite the numerous studies measuring either the technical efficiency of (local) govern-
ments as a whole (global approaches) or particular areas of (local) public goods provision
(like waste collection, police services or hospitals), only few studies have tried to assess the
efficiency of local road maintenance so far. In fact, there are only a couple of studies inves-
tigating the scale and technical efficiency of local road maintenance for several US states:
Deller et al. (1988) and Chicoine et al. (1989) examine the size efficiency in the production
of rural roads by means of cost functions. Both studies identify substantial size inefficiencies
and conclude that cost reductions could be realised by restructuring the production of rural
roads. Deller and Nelson (1991), Deller et al. (1992), Deller (1992) and Deller and Halstead
(1994), on the other hand, investigate the technical efficiency of rural road maintenance
using different parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques. Their estimation re-
sults suggest that road maintenance costs are 14 to 50 percent higher than necessary due to
production inefficiencies. Apart from these studies, Rouse et al. (1997) examine the perfor-
mance (efficiency, effectiveness and economy) of highway maintenance activities for a sample
of territorial local authorities (TLAs) in New Zealand. Using Data Envelopment Analysis,
the authors estimate an average efficiency score of 89%, meaning that the local authorities
1An overview of the literature on the determinants of (local) governments’ efficiency will be provided in
section 3.
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in New Zealand (on average) should be able to attain the same level of output (i.e. road
maintenance) by using only 89% of total expenditures they are currently using. Finally,
Hjalmarsson and Odeck (1996) analyse the efficiency of trucks in road construction and
maintenance operated by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (PRA). The authors
also find evidence for substantial inefficiencies among the PRAs. Moreover, their results
suggest that neither the age nor the brand of the trucks influence efficiency.
The present study adds to this previous literature in three main ways. Firstly, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first who examine the determinants of efficiency for the
case of (local) road maintenance. As mentioned above, the usage of such a specific approach
(rather than a global approach) reduces the problem of finding appropriate input and output
indicators and therefore potential sources of measurement errors. Secondly, we analyse the
determinants of efficiency by applying and comparing different cost frontier models (stochas-
tic frontier approaches and DEA) rather than using only one estimation approach (as done
by the most previous studies). Specifically, the estimation methods which are used to ex-
plain the variation in efficiency correct for the bias arising in typical two-step approaches
by employing a one-step approach in the stochastic frontier analysis (proposed by Battese
and Coelli, 1995) and a (double) bootstrapping correction in the DEA-analysis (proposed
by Simar and Wilson, 2007). Thirdly, our empirical analysis is based on a broad panel of
German counties (rather than a cross-section used in the most previous studies which in-
vestigated the determinants of efficiency). The German counties are an interesting case to
study, since one of the main tasks of these counties is the construction and maintenance of
county roads. The main results of our analysis show that (controlling for numerous charac-
teristics of the counties) the disposable income of the counties’ citizens, intergovernmental
grants (for county roads), and the payments to the counties influence technical efficiency
negatively. For the political variables we find weak evidence that efficiency decreases with
an increasing share of seats of left-wing parties in the county council; on the other hand,
the hypothesis that efficiency decreases with the degree of political concentration in the
county council could not be confirmed. Moreover, the analysis shows, that it is important to
test the robustness of the results by applying and comparing different (frontier) estimation
techniques.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodological approaches used
in this paper. In section 3 we briefly review the empirical literature on the determinants of
local governments’ (technical) efficiency. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis including
an introduction to the institutional setting of the local governments as well as the main
features of local road maintenance in Germany. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 5.
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2 Methodology
For the measurement of the (relative) efficiency of decision making units (here: counties) it
is first necessary to define an appropriate set of input and output combinations. The inputs
and outputs are then used to construct a best practice frontier - that is a frontier which
includes the most efficient decision making units. Subsequently, the (relative) efficiency of
the other decision making units lying below the best practice frontier can be determined by
measuring the deviation from this frontier. Basically, frontiers have been estimated using two
different methods: non-parametric and parametric approaches.2 In the present analysis we
use one non-parametric approach (DEA) and one parametric approach (stochastic frontier
analysis), respectively, to obtain efficiency indices. Both of them will be shortly reviewed in
the following. In a second step, these efficiency indices are then used to determine the main
drivers of (in)efficiency.
2.1 Non-Parametric Approach: DEA
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; Farrell, 1957; Charnes et al., 1978) is based on the idea
that the best practice frontier envelopes the data as tightly as possible. This envelopment
is achieved by solving a sequence of linear programmes, one for each decision making unit.
There are several variants of DEA concerning the behavioural objective of the decision-
making units (input- or output-orientation) and the returns to scale. This study is based on
the input-oriented and variable returns to scale variant (see Banker et al., 1984). The input-
orientation is applied since the public sector usually has to provide a given amount of output
(e.g. in our case roads) and, based on this output, an optimal amount of input(s) will be
chosen (and not vice versa); on the other hand, the assumption of constant returns to scale
is only appropriate when all decision-making units operate at an optimal scale. Given the
fact that we use counties differing considerably in size3 the assumption of variable returns
to scale seems to be more appropriate. The DEA model is then specified by solving the
2For an introduction, see e.g. Fried et al. (2008)
3For the descriptive statistics of the data, see subsection 4.2.
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following linear programming problem:
min θ0
s.t. θ0xk,0 −
n∑
i=1
λixk,i ≥ 0 with k = 1, ...,m
n∑
i=1
λiyr,i ≥ yr,0 with r = 1, ..., s
n∑
i=1
λi = 0
θ0 > 0, (1)
where x0 and xi denote the input levels used by decision-making units 0 and i, respectively,
to produce the output levels y0 and yi. Furthermore, k (r) equals the number of inputs
(outputs) employed in the production process, n represents the number of decision-making
units and the λi’s are weights given to those decisions-making units which are referred to by
the comparison with decision-making unit 0. Solving the linear programming problem (1) n
times generates the efficiency indices θ1 to θn, one for each decision-making unit. Providers
with efficiency scores of θ < 1 are technical inefficient, since they are capable of reducing
their input(s) without affecting the amount of output; on the other hand, efficient providers
receive efficiency scores of θ = 1.
A graphical representation of the input-oriented DEA with variable returns to scale (VRS)
is given in figure 1 for the special case of one input (x) and one output(y). As can be seen
from the figure, the decision-making units A, B, and C form the best practice frontier. The
decision-making unit P, however, is deemed to be inefficient since it lies beneath the frontier.
The input-oriented technical inefficiency measure of point P is given by the ratio of the
distances P ′′P ′ and P ′′P :
θP =
P ′′P ′
P ′′P
, 0 < θP < 1. (2)
The figure also reveals that the reference points for the determination of the inefficiency of
decision-making unit P are given by A and B.
2.2 Incorporating Exogenous Influences on Efficiency in DEA-Analyses
One crucial problem with the efficiency estimates derived from equation (1) is that they treat
all decision-making units (here: counties) on the same footing. However, in some cases it
may be advisable to take into account exogenous or non-discretionary variables which may
influence the performance of the decision-making units. As pointed out by Kalb (2008),
we can distinguish two types of such external influences: firstly, characteristics of decision-
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Figure 1: VRS input-oriented DEA example with one input (x) and one output (y)
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making units which influence their individual production possibilities and which describe the
production environment. In our case one example of such an external constraint would be
the geographical location of the county: A county in a hilly region may need to spend more
money on a given road infrastructure than a county located on the plain. The second type
of external influences are the determinants of technical efficiency (which are of main interest
in this study), like the political orientation of the local government. These variables affect
the level of the counties’ technical efficiency but have no impact on the shape of the best
practice frontier.
The most common approach to incorporate these exogenous variables into (non-parametric)
efficiency analyses is the two-stage method : In a first-stage analysis the linear programming
problem (1) is solved, and afterwards, in a second stage, the efficiency scores derived from the
first stage are regressed on the exogenous variables. Since the efficiency scores are bounded
between zero and one, most researchers used censored regression techniques (Tobit) to esti-
mate the influence of exogenous variables on technical efficiency.4 The two-stage approach,
however, has been criticised in three ways (see Simar and Wilson, 2007): Firstly, the DEA
efficiency indices obtained by solving the linear programming problem (1) are serially cor-
related (in finite samples), since perturbations of observations that are lying on the best
practice frontier will in many cases cause changes in the efficiency scores of other (ineffi-
cient) observations. This, however, means that the error term of the second-stage regression
is serially correlated as well. Secondly, since the exogenous or non-discretionary variables are
correlated with the inputs and outputs (otherwise there would be no need for a second-stage
4For a review of two-stage approaches, see Simar and Wilson (2007).
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regression), the non-discretionary variables must also be correlated with the error term of
the second-stage regression. Indeed, both correlations disappear asymptotically, but only at
a slow rate. Finally, Simar and Wilson (2007) show that the efficiency indices obtained by
solving the linear programming problem (1) are biased towards one in small samples.
Simar and Wilson (2007) propose an alternative procedure which avoids the above men-
tioned problems. This estimation approach is based on a double bootstrap procedure, where,
in a first step, the biased efficiency indices are corrected (steps [1] to [4], see below) and,
subsequently, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients of the second-stage regression
(of the adjusted efficiency indices on the exogenous variables) are corrected (steps [5] to
[7], see below).5 Moreover, the authors argue that the second-stage regression should be
conducted by a truncated instead of a censored (Tobit) regression, since the efficiency in-
dices are truncated (at one) by construction and not because of censoring. Then, the double
bootstrap procedure involves the following steps:
[1] Compute the efficiency scores θˆi, i = 1, .., n by solving the linear programming
problem (1).
[2] Estimate the following truncated regression by maximum likelihood: θˆi = ziβ+εi,
i = 1, .., n, where zi is a vector of exogenous variables and β is a vector of
parameters to be estimated - using the m < n observations where θˆi < 1 - and
obtain an estimate βˆ of β and σˆε of σε.
[3] Compute L1 bootstrap estimates for each θi as follows: For each i = 1, ...,m, draw
εi from the N(0, σˆ
2
ε)-distribution with left-truncation at (1 − ziβˆ) and compute
θ∗i = ziβˆ + εi; set x
∗
i = xi
θˆi
θ∗i
, y∗i = yi and compute θˆ
∗
i by solving the linear
programming problem (1), whereas xi in the first constraint is replaced by x
∗
i .
[4] For each i = 1, ..., n, compute the bias-corrected efficiency estimator
θ˜i = 2 · θˆi − θ¯∗i , where θ¯∗i = 1L1
∑L1
l=1 θˆ
∗
l,i.
[5] Estimate the following truncated regression by maximum likelihood: θ˜i = ziβ+εi,
i = 1, .., n, where zi is a vector of exogenous variables and β is a vector of
parameters to be estimated - using the m < n observations where θ˜i < 1 - and
obtain an estimate β˜ of β and σ˜ε of σε.
[6] Compute L bootstrap estimates of β and σε as follows: For each i = 1, ...,m, draw
εi from the N(0, σˆ
2
ε)-distribution with left-truncation at (1 − ziβ˜) and compute
θ˜∗i = ziβ˜ + εi (again for each i = 1, ...,m). Use the maximum likelihood method
to estimate the truncated regression of θ˜∗i on zi, yielding bootstrap estimates
(β˜∗, σ˜∗ε).
[7] Use the bootstrap values to construct confidence intervals for β and σε (for a
detailed description see Simar and Wilson, 2007, p. 43).
5Note that Simar and Wilson (2007) also propose a single bootstrap procedure (algorithm 1 ) where they
correct only for the biased standard errors of the estimated coefficients in the second-stage regression.
According to Simar and Wilson, however, the double bootstrap procedure (algorithm 2 ) outperforms the
single bootstrap procedure (in terms of coverage of estimated confidence intervals). Therefore, we only
present the results of the double bootstrap procedure in section 4. The results of the single bootstrap
procedure are, however, (qualitatively) very similar and are available upon request.
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In the present analysis we apply and compare both methods, the second-stage Tobit
regression and the double bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). To be
in line with the authors we set L1 - the number of bootstrap replications in the first procedure
- equal to 200 and L - the number of bootstrap replications in the second procedure - equal
to 2000.
2.3 Parametric Approach: Stochastic Frontier Analysis
In contrast to the non-parametric estimation techniques, parametric approaches determine
the best practice frontier on the basis of a specific functional form using econometric tech-
niques. More specifically, stochastic frontier models (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and
Van den Broeck, 1977) decompose the deviation from the efficiency line into two components:
an inefficiency part and a part arising from other stochastic influences or measurement er-
rors. Therefore, stochastic frontier models are - compared to non-parametric methods - more
precise concerning the definition of the deviation from the best practice frontier. This, how-
ever, comes at the cost of having to specify a functional form and making assumptions about
the distribution of the inefficiency term. When the true functional form of the input(s) and
output(s) is unknown, this problem can be mitigated by choosing a more flexible functional
form, namely a translogarithmic function (Christensen et al., 1973) which is an extension of
the more basic Cobb-Douglas function. Employing a translogarithmic function, a stochastic
frontier model can be written as:
lnxi = β0 +
s∑
r=1
βrlnyr,i +
1
2
s∑
r=1
s∑
q=1
βr,qlnyr,ilnyq,i + vi + ui︸ ︷︷ ︸
=εi
, i = 1, ..., n, (3)
where i is again the subscript for the decision-making units and s denotes the number of
outputs. As in the non-parametric case, the y’s are the various output variables and x
denotes the input variable. Note that in the case of stochastic frontier models the usage of
only one input (or output) is possible. Furthermore, the composed error term of equation
(3) consists of a symmetric component, v, which is usually assumed to be independently and
identically normally distributed N(0, σ2v), and a one-sided non-negative component u ≥ 0,
representing inefficiency. The inefficiency component is often assumed to follow a half-normal
or a truncated normal distribution.6 Both error components are assumed to be independent.
A graphical representation of the stochastic frontier model is given in figure 2 (again for
the special case of one input, x, and one output, y). Since the regression model is parametric,
the best practice frontier is - in contrast to DEA - a smooth curve. Moreover, the deviation
of the decision-making unit P from the best practice frontier (PP ′) is now decomposed in
6For more details, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
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Figure 2: Example of a stochastic frontier with one input (x) and one output (y)
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the inefficiency component uP and the (symmetric) component vP capturing the effects of
other sources of random noise. In the DEA model, the whole distance PP ′ (see figure 1)
was interpreted as inefficiency. Unlike DEA, it is also possible that for some decision-making
units the influence of random noise dominates the influence of inefficiency. In this case the
decision-making unit ends up above and not beneath the best practice frontier (e.g. point
B).
2.4 Incorporating Exogenous Influences on Efficiency in Stochastic
Frontier Analyses
As with the DEA approach, exogenous or non-discretionary variables have been incorpo-
rated into stochastic frontier analyses by using two-stage methods, that is, in a first stage,
equation (3) is estimated and afterwards, the efficiency scores ui, i = 1, ...n obtained from
this estimation are regressed on the exogenous variables in an OLS regression (see e.g. Pitt
and Lee, 1981; Vitaliano, 1997). However, as pointed out by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000),
there are serious econometric problems with this two-stage approach. Firstly, it must be
assumed that the exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the elements of the output vec-
tor, yi. If this is not the case, the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the
model are biased. If the set of inputs, outputs and exogenous variables is very large, this
assumption is very likely to be violated. Moreover, since it is assumed in the first stage that
the efficiency scores are independently and identically distributed, the assumption that the
efficiency scores have a functional relationship with the exogenous variables in the second
stage regression is falsified.
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To avoid the second of the above mentioned problems, researchers developed one-step
procedures, in which the parameters of the stochastic frontier as well as the parameters
of the exogenous variables are estimated simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood (see e.g.
Kumbhakar et al., 1991). A one-step procedure that also accounts for the use of panel data
was proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). Since our data are based on a panel of German
counties, we make use of this estimator. Using (again) a translogarithmic specification, this
leads to the following extension of equation (3):
lnxi,t = β0 +
s∑
r=1
βrlnyr,i,t +
1
2
s∑
r=1
s∑
q=1
βr,qlnyr,i,tlnyq,i,t + ψt + vi,t + ui,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=εi,t
(4)
ui,t = δ0 +
q∑
j=1
δjzj,i,t + ψt + wi,t. (5)
where t is the time subscript and q denotes the number of exogenous variables z. The random
variable w is defined by the the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2w (see Battese and Coelli, 1995). Finally, the time trends ψt are included to control
for both technical change (in the stochastic frontier) and time-varying inefficiency effects.
In the present study we use both methods, the one- and two-step procedure. Together
with the two approaches derived in subsection 2.2 we end up with four different estimation
approaches. This broad variety of estimation approaches allows us to test the robustness of
the derived results. However, before presenting the estimation results, a short review of the
literature on the determinants of the technical or cost efficiency of local governments will be
provided.
3 Literature Review
In the following we give a short review of the literature on the determinants of public sector
efficiency. More specifically, we focus on studies which investigate the determinants of the
technical or cost efficiency of local governments as a whole (global approaches) instead of
studies which focus on (the determinants of efficiency of) specific areas of the public sector
like schools, hospitals, utility services and so on.7 By doing so, we are able to compare
the results of the global approaches with the results of one specific area of public goods
provision, namely the construction and maintenance of (county) roads. However, as already
mentioned in the introduction, there are only few studies that try to explain variations in
local governments’ technical or cost efficiency. In fact, the number of studies is restricted to
7For a review on efficiency studies which focus on specific areas of public goods provision, see e.g. Blank
(2000); Worthington and Dollery (2000).
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a small sample of countries.
Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993), De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b),
and Geys and Moesen (2009), for example, focus on different aspects of the determinants of
efficiency for the Belgian municipalities. Using a cross-section of 235 Walloon municipali-
ties, Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) show that political majorities are an explanatory factor
of the observed inefficiencies. By decomposing the efficiency scores obtained by a FDH- and
DEA-analysis in different (political) categories, the authors show, that local governments
run by nationwide parties are more efficient than local councils where other majorities are
in power. A further result is that local governments with multiple-party coalitions are more
efficient than municipalities governed by a single party. The focus of De Borger et al. (1994)
and De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b), on the other hand, is much broader. Similar to
Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) they find - for a cross-section of all 589 Belgian municipalities
- (weak) evidence that political characteristics influence local government efficiency. More-
over, they show that local tax rates and the level of education influence efficiency positively
whereas (block) grants and (average) income is associated with lower efficiency levels. In
all three studies the variations in efficiency among local governments are explained by a
second-stage (Tobit) regression on the efficiency scores obtained in a first stage by several
parametric and non-parametric estimation approaches. In contrast to the three above men-
tioned studies, the results of Geys and Moesen (2009) suggest that grants from higher level
governments affect efficiency positively; they employ, however, the one-step approach pro-
posed by Battese and Coelli (1995) for a cross-section of only the Flemish municipalities.
According to the authors this (surprising) result could be due to the fact that grants from
higher level governments in Flanders are linked to strict supervision on expenditures.
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) and Gimenez and Prior (2007) explore in a cross-sectional
analysis the sources of efficiency of Spanish municipalities. While Gimenez and Prior (2007)
explain the efficiency indices obtained in the first stage by means of a Tobit regression,
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) use non-parametric smoothing techniques in the second stage.
Both analyses support the findings of the above mentioned studies: Fiscal, political and ed-
ucational variables are (significantly) related to local governments’ efficiency. Similar results
are also obtained by Afonso and Fernandes (2008), Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998),
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005), and Worthington (2000) for samples of local governments
of Portugal, Greece, Finland, and Australia, respectively. All four studies share the com-
mon feature that they investigate the determinants of efficiency in a cross-sectional analysis
(exception: Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2005) by regressing the efficiency indices (obtained by
DEA or stochastic frontier approaches in the first stage) on the potential determinants using
Tobit or OLS regression techniques.
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In a further study, Borge et al. (2008) examine how the efficiency of Norwegian local
governments is related to political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic
participation. They construct an efficiency measure which is defined as the ratio of an
aggregate output indicator and local government revenue and regress this measure on a set
of explanatory variables. The results of their study suggest that high fiscal capacity as well as
a high degree of party fragmentation contribute to low efficiency; democratic participation,
on the other hand, seems to influence efficiency positively. Furthermore, the authors find
evidence that a centralised top-down budgetary procedure is associated with low efficiency.
Moreover, Grossman et al. (1999) investigate the technical efficiency of 49 U.S. cities by
using an aggregate market value of residential homes and business property as an output
indicator. By means of a stochastic frontier production function, which also includes the
exogenous variables, the authors show that large cities in the United States are operating
at (rather) different levels of technical efficiency and that the degree of technical inefficiency
varies inversely with the measured levels of competitive pressures. Finally, Sung (2007)
evaluates the performance of local governments in Korea. More specifically, the author
focuses on the impact of information technology (IT) on the technical efficiency of the local
governments. Using Data Envelopment Analysis and a second-stage Tobit regression, Sung
(2007) shows that IT has a postive impact on the technical efficiency of the Korean local
governments. Moreover, the results hint at the presence of economics of density in the
production of local public services.
To sum up, the existing empirical literature on the determinants of local government ef-
ficiency employs in most cases efficiency indices as dependent variables which are obtained
either by parametric or non-parametric estimation approaches. In contrast, there are only
few studies which employ and compare both approaches (see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens,
1996a). Moreover, researchers mostly used the “traditional” two-stage approaches to inves-
tigate the determinants of local government efficiency; the one-step approach proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1995) or the truncated regression along with the bootstrap correction
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) have only been used in few investigations so far (see
e.g. Geys and Moesen, 2009). However, as already shown in the previous section, the “tra-
ditional” two-stage approaches (in the context of parametric or non-parametric approaches)
yield biased estimation results. Finally, the literature review reveals that there is no study
that investigates the general determinants of the technical or cost efficiency (in the broadest
sense) of the German local authorities.
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4 Empirical Analysis
Based on the methods derived in section 2, the following empirical analysis tries to investigate
the main drivers of local government technical efficiency for the case of road maintenance.
For this purpose, we make us of a broad panel of counties of the German state Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg.8 In our context, the German counties are an interesting case to study, since
one of the main tasks of these counties is the construction and maintenance of county roads.
However, before presenting the results along with the underlying data set, the institutional
setting of the local governments as well as the main features of local road maintenance in
Germany will be provided.
4.1 Institutional Setting and Local Road Maintenance
Germany is characterised by a federal structure, where the local governments constitute the
lowest level of government. The local governments, in turn, can basically be divided into two
administrative units: counties and municipalities, whereas the counties constitute the higher
administrative level. More specifically, we can distinguish between rural (Landkreise) and
urban (Stadtkreise) counties. The former are associations of a fixed number of municipalities,
the latter consist of only one municipality (city) and are therefore county and municipality
at the same time.9 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the state considered here, consists of 35 rural and
9 urban counties. According to the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz ) both administrative
units (counties and municipalities) are guaranteed the right to local self-government (art.
28, para. 2). Therefore, counties as well as municipalities exhibit considerable autonomy on
the revenue as well as the expenditure side. Since our data are based on a panel of German
counties, we restrict our attention to the institutional setting of the counties (rather than
municipalities) now.
According to Neser (2004), the counties have to perform three different types of tasks: (1)
voluntary tasks like adult education centres or museum, (2) duties with instruction (from
higher level governments) like the payment of housing benefit, and (3) duties without in-
struction like local public transport, waste disposal and the construction and maintenance
of county roads, which is of main interest in the present analysis. The importance of this
responsibility is stressed by the fact that the county road network in 2004 covered approxi-
mately 12.000 kilometres, which constitutes about 43% of the total road network10 outside
of built-up areas in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
8According to the NUTS-nomenclature established by Eurostat, the counties correspond to NUTS 3 regions.
9For more details, see Neser (2004)
10In Germany there are basically four different types of roads (with regard to the financing of the roads):
roads that have to be financed (1) by the federal state (Bundesfernstraßen), (2) by the states (Land-
straßen), (3) by the counties (Kreisstraßen), and (4) by the municipalities (Gemeindestraßen).
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Table 2: Revenues and expenditures of the (rural) counties in Euro per capita (1) and as a
percentage of total revenues and total expenditures (2), respectively, for selected
categories in 2004
Revenues (1) (2) Expenditures (1) (2)
Payments to counties 211.70 38.72 Social security 174.80 31.83
Allocation of funds 143.82 26.31 General financial management 142.89 26.02
User charges, fines, Public facilities, business
reimbursement of costs 107.95 19.75 development 62.62 11.40
Borrowing 23.77 4.35 Schools 57.81 10.53
Taxes 0.26 0.05 General administration 42.45 7.73
Other sources of revenuea 59.20 10.83 Public safety 23.72 4.32
Architecture, housing, traffic 22.31 4.06
Health, sport, recovery 17.14 3.12
Science, research, culture 3.88 0.71
Commercial companies,
real and separate estate 1.59 0.29
Sum 546.70 100 549.20 100
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, own calculations
a These include income from interest, shares in profit, concession levy, capital gains and cost-accounting
depreciation
Table 2 shows the main income sources of the (rural) counties as well as the amount
of money spent for the different types of tasks the counties face - per capita (1) and as a
percentage of total revenues and total expenditures (2) for the year 2004.11 Looking first at
the revenue structure, the table reveals that the counties basically have three main income
sources: contributions, which have to be paid by the municipalities (Kreisumlage; 38.72%
of total revenues), allocation of funds (from the state level and from municipal equalisation
schemes; 26.31%) and income from user charges, fines and reimbursement of costs (19.75%).
More specifically, the size of the payments to the counties is based on a predetermined
collection rate (Hebesatz ) on the sum of the different (tax) revenues of the municipalities
belonging to the county.12 The counties are able to levy theses contributions (from the
municipalities) if the other revenues (user charges, allocations of funds,...) are not sufficient
to cover cost. Therefore, the payments to the counties can be interpreted as a kind of “tax”.13
Concerning (real) tax revenues, the counties impose only one tax on hunting. As can be seen
from table 2, however, this tax is of minor importance (0.05% of total revenues). This is in
sharp contrast to the municipalities (and urban counties) which can independently decide
11In table 2 we consider only rural counties, since there are differences between rural and urban counties
concerning the revenue and expenditure structure. This is due to the fact that urban counties are county
and municipality at the same time and therefore also have to represent municipal interests.
12Note that the collection rates can differ from county to county. In 2004 the average collection rate was
33.62%.
13The difference between the payments to the counties and “usual” taxes is that the payments to the counties
are not paid by the citizens (of the jurisdictions) themselves but by the municipal governments belonging
to the counties.
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on five different types of taxes: trade tax, property tax and three bagatelle taxes (which are
not levied by all municipalities).
Finally, turning to the expenditure side, table 2 also gives a detailed overview of the
money spent for the different types of tasks (for the year 2004). As can be seen from the
table, almost one third of the money is used for social security (31.83% of total expendi-
tures), but a major part is also spent on general financial management (i.e. mainly interest
and amortization repayments; 26.02%), public facilities and business development (11.40%),
schools (10.53%) and general administration (7.73%). Architecture, housing and traffic ac-
counts for 4.06% of total expenditures. This also includes the construction and maintenance
of (county) roads which approximately accounts for 3% of total expenditures. Moreover,
public safety and health, sport and recovery constitute 4.32% and 3.12% of the total bud-
get, respectively, whereas the last two posts on the budget (science, research and culture;
commercial companies, real and separate estate) are of minor importance.
4.2 Data
As already mentioned at the beginning of this section, the empirical analysis is based on
data for 44 counties of the German state Baden-Wu¨rttemberg for the period of 1990 to
2004. Therefore, we end up with a sample of 660 observations. The descriptive statistics for
all variables used in the analysis are given in table 3 below.14
As pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), the definition of public sector inputs
and outputs is difficult and fraught with data availability problems. But since we examine
the main drivers of technical efficiency in a specific (here: road maintenance) rather than a
global approach (like in De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a), potential sources of measurement
errors are mitigated. More specifically, we follow Deller and Halstead (1994) and approximate
the input necessary to construct and maintain the county roads by the total expenditures
(for county roads). As can be seen from table 3, the expenditures for county roads show
substantial variation within the sample used here.
Moreover, the output, that is the supply of roads to the populace, is measured by the
area of the total road network which is under jurisdiction of the counties. Table 3 shows
that the area of the county roads in the sample varies between approximately 12 and 350
hectare indicating that there are substantial variations among the counties. As a second
output indicator, we include a variable which approximates not only the quantity but also
the quality of the services provided. As pointed out by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) this is of
great importance, since local governments often are not able to directly affect the quantity
14For more details on the sources of the data as well as the calculation of some of the variables, see Appendix
A.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Input variable:
Total expenditures, county roads
3.92 2.53 0.09 18.20
(in mio. e)
Output variables:
Area of county roads (in hectare) 158.753 90.336 12.293 349.992
Number of accidents due to bad
167.755 98.699 15 509
road conditions
Exogenous variables (characteristics):
Unemployment rate (in %) 6.499 1.955 2.275 13.900
Population density (inhabitants per hectare) 5.067 5.761 0.946 28.863
Rurality 4.773 2.100 1 7
Total Population 233296.80 122651.50 50891 598470
Accommodation facilities 156.827 144.421 19 883
Average (weighted) kilometres travelled on
2473.16 1489.25 217.63 8311.67
county roads per year (in 10000 km)
Maximum geographical point of county
637.29 225.34 146.51 1281.91
(in metre)
Urban county 0.205 0.404 0 1
Exogenous variables (determinants):
Disposable income (in e per capita) 16413.27 1928.27 11836.23 23180.12
Payments to counties (in e per capita) 256.61 144.38 87.81 1065.81
Grants for county roads (in e per capita) 16.66 12.74 0 60.43
Herfindahl index 0.295 0.040 0.217 0.413
Share of left 31.090 7.623 10.714 50.000
Sample size: 660 observations; 44 counties over 15 years (1990-2004).
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of outputs (at least in the short run), but have a decisive impact on their quality. As an
indicator of the quality of the county roads we include the number of accidents caused by
bad road conditions like potholes, ruts and so on.15 An increase in the number of accidents
(meaning a deterioration in quality) is then expected to lower the costs for the provision of
roads.
Since the purpose of this analysis is to investigate the determinants of technical efficiency
(in road maintenance), the crucial part of the model refers to the inclusion of the exogenous
variables. Concerning the characteristics of the counties we first include a measure which
accounts for the volume of traffic on the county roads: the average (weighted) kilometres trav-
elled on county roads per year. This indicator is calculated out of the sum of the kilometres
travelled on county roads by motorcycles, cars and trucks with a maximum total weight of
below and above 12 tons, whereas every of the four categories is given a special weight. Since
higher traffic loads are associated with higher repair costs, we expect a positive relationship
between costs and average kilometres travelled. In addition, to account for the geographical
location of the county we include the maximum geographical point of the county. Then, the
hypothesis is that counties located in more hilly regions have to spend comparatively more
money on the construction and maintenance of roads since the development of the landscape
is much more complicated (e.g. via bridges and tunnels).
The production environment is further accounted for through the inclusion of the popula-
tion density and the total population (along with its squared value) of the counties. While
a high population density points to cost advantages due to the regional concentration of the
public services (see De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a), population density can also be regarded
as a proxy for the heterogeneity of the property prices which usually tend be higher in more
densely populated areas. Therefore, the influence of population density on the level of the
counties’ expenditures is ambiguous. On the other hand, total population is included to con-
trol for potential (dis)economies of scale (see Geys and Moesen, 2009), that is expenditures
are assumed to increase with total population. We further include an index of rurality to
the estimation specification; this index splits the counties (of Germany) in three different
categories: (1) agglomeration areas, (2) urbanised areas, and (3) rural areas. Moreover,
within every group, there are up to four different classes differing in population size as well
as population density. Altogether, there are nine different types of counties, whereas a higher
number indicates a higher degree of “rurality”.16 Therefore, this index captures not only
15Note that this variable also contains accidents caused by other bad road conditions (e.g. by slippery
roads). Unfortunately, a more detailed indicator was not available. In addition, the number of accidents
caused by bad road conditions were available only for the total road network. But given the fact that
county roads constitute 43% of the total road network (outside of built-up areas) in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(see subsection 4.1) this is a minor problem.
16For more details on the classification of the counties, see Appendix A
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information about population size and population density, it also provides information about
the sphere of influence of supra-regional cities. Since property prices usually tend to be lower
in rural areas, an increase in this index (that is a higher degree of rurality) is expected to
lower costs.17
Moreover, to control for economic shocks, the local unemployment rate is included to the
model. As pointed out by Geys et al. (2008), the unemployment rate can affect spending in
two opposite directions, since it implies both higher spending on unemployment benefits (like
housing benefit; “cost effect”) and lower demand for high quality public services (“preference
effect”). Therefore, the effect of the level of the unemployment rate on expenditures is
ambiguous. In addition, counties located in touristic regions (like the Black Forest or the
region around Lake Constance) have to spend more money on public services, since tourists
usually demand higher-cost or higher-quality services (see Sampaio De Sousa and Stosic,
2005; Kalb, 2008). For this reason, the total number of the counties’ accommodation facilities
(that is, guesthouses of all forms) was included to the model. An increase in the number of
accommodation facilities is then expected to rise costs.
Apart from the characteristics of the counties we are also (and mainly) interested in the
determinants of technical efficiency. Regarding this, we firstly include the per capita dis-
posable income of the counties’ citizens, since “it is well known that incomes and wealth
of citizens affect the incentives of both politicians and taxpayers to monitor expenditures”
(De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a, p. 162). Higher income levels increase the fiscal capacity
and therefore may foster potential inefficiencies (by the incumbents). In addition, the moti-
vation of high-income citizens to monitor incumbents could be relatively low due to higher
opportunity costs. On the other hand, as argued by Knack (2002), high-income citizens are
more educated and might therefore be more effective in demanding more efficient govern-
ments. For this reason, the effect of the per capita disposable income on technical efficiency
is ambiguous.
Second, we included variables to the specification that account for the financing of the
provision of the public goods and services (here: county roads). As pointed out by De Borger
and Kerstens (1996a), higher tax burdens may increase the awareness of the citizens how
public funds are used. This, in turn, could lead to an increase in the monitoring activities of
the populace and therefore to a decrease in the budgetary slack (or inefficiency). Moreover,
recent studies for Germany and Belgium found evidence for significant (tax) competition
effects between local jurisdictions (see Buettner, 2001; Geys, 2006). One possibility to reduce
the tax rates (due to higher tax competition), is to remove or at least to reduce potential
17Note that Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the state considered here, consists only of agglomeration as well as ur-
banised areas (see table 3). This is due to the fact that Baden-Wu¨rrtemberg is one of the more industri-
alised states in Germany.
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inefficiencies. To proxy for the above mentioned effects, the payments to the counties - which
can be interpreted as a kind of tax levied by the counties (see also subsection 4.1) - are
included to the specification.18 Besides the autonomously raised revenue, the counties also
receive (intergovernmental) grants (see subsection 4.1). From the literature on the flypaper
effect (for a review, see e.g. Hines and Thaler, 1995) it is well known, that money obtained
from lump-sum grants is differently used than money which originates from own income
sources. Numerous studies showed that unconditional grants stimulate spending by much
more than economic theory predicts. Recently, Kalb (2008) showed for a sample of German
municipalities that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalisation
fosters the incentives of the incumbents to extend organisational slack (or inefficiency). Using
data on libraries and school bus transportation, Silkman and Young (1982) came to similar
conclusions for the United States. Therefore it is hypothesised that technical efficiency
decreases with the amount of grants. To take account of theses effects we added the per
capita grants for county roads to the specification.
In addition, political variables are included to the model, since there are a number of
reasons why politicians may lack proper incentives to effectively monitor and control public
spending (see e.g. Mueller, 2003). First, we introduce a Herfindahl index which measures
the political concentration or monopolisation of the county council (Kreistag). This index
is calculated using the seat shares of the main national parties (from right to left: CDU,
FDP, SPD and GRU¨NE) and of the so-called “free voters unions” in the county council.19
Then, high political concentration is associated with lower efficiency levels since high political
concentration involves low political competition (see e.g. Besley et al., 2005). Second, we
include a variable which measures the impact of ideology on technical efficiency: the share of
seats of the left-wing parties (that is SPD and GRU¨NE) in the county council. As pointed out
by Geys et al. (2008), however, the relationship between ideology and (technical) efficiency is
not easy to determine a priori. Indeed, left-wing parties are often associated with preferences
for higher spending, a larger government size, however, does not necessarily imply lower levels
of efficiency. Therefore, the sign of the variable share of left is ambiguous.
Finally, we include a dummy variable for urban counties as well as a time trend to control
for time effects in the stochastic frontier as well as in the (second-stage) inefficiency model.
18Since the urban counties do not receive payments from municipalities (because they are county and
municipality at the same time), we took the revenue from the trade tax to proxy the (main) income
source of the urban counties.
19Free voters unions are loose federations of persons that do not belong to specific political parties and exist
only at the local level.
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4.3 Results
The results of the different estimation approaches are shown in the following two tables: In
table 4 we present the results of the one-step procedure proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995)
(columns 1 and 2) as well as the results of the two-step procedure (columns 3 and 4), where -
according to equation (3) - in a first stage20 efficiency scores are estimated, and, afterwards,
the efficiency estimates obtained in the first stage are regressed on the exogenous variables in
a pooled OLS regression. On the other hand, the effects of the exogenous variables on DEA-
based efficiency estimates are shown in table 5, whereas the results of the Tobit regression
are given in columns 1 and 2 and the results of the truncated regression with the bootstrap
corrected t-values proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) (see subsection 2.2) are shown in
columns 3 and 4. Note that in table 4 (5) a positive signs means inefficiency (efficiency)
enhancing and vice versa.21
Before starting with the discussion of the (main) determinants of efficiency, we first con-
sider the estimation results of the stochastic frontier in the one-step approach proposed
by Battese and Coelli (1995) in table 4. As expected, the area of the county roads has a
positive and highly statistically significant impact on total expenditures for county roads.
However, the impact of our second output variable, the number of accidents due to bad
road conditions approximating the quality of the county roads, is - contrary to our predic-
tions - positive and not statistically significant. This could be due to the fact that county
roads (in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg) are (generally) in good condition (see Neser, 2004, p. 75)
and therefore quality is of minor importance. Finally, note that a likelihood ratio test of
the translogarithmic against the Cobb-Douglas functional form rejected the Cobb-Douglas
function at the one percent level indicating that the (more flexible) translograrithmic model
(used here) seems to be more appropriate.
Turning now to the discussion of the impact of the exogenous variables on technical effi-
ciency, table 4 and 5 illustrate that it is first important to account for the characteristics and
the production environment of the counties. More specifically, we first observe the desired
positive relationship between the average (weighted) kilometres travelled on county roads
and costs (due to higher costs of wear on much frequented roads) in all four specifications.
Second, total population also shows a positive relationship, the coefficients of the full specifi-
cations are, however, insignificant (exception: specification (3) in table 5). But this changes
20For the results of the first-stage stochastic frontier regression, see table B1, Appendix B.
21The differences in the interpretation of the signs in table 4 and 5 are due to the fact that either the
efficiency scores (lying between 0 and 1) or their reciprocals (lying between 1 and ∞) can be used as
independent variables in the (second-stage) regression. We used both values as independent variables
(for the non-parametric as well as the parametric efficiency estimates) and chose those models with the
highest adjusted pseudo-R2. The results of the (two) remaining models, however, are very similar and
are available upon request.
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Table 4: Determinants of the counties’ efficiency in road maintenance (parametric approach)
Variable One-step approach Two-step ap proach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stochastic Frontier
Constant 7.1211** 6.9312** - -
(7.9024) (8.7659)
A: Area of county roads, log 2.1229** 2.1314** - -
(7.7885) (8.3122)
B: Number of accidents due to 0.1236 0.1839 - -
bad road conditions, log (0.3903) (0.6158)
A2 -0.0744** -0.0780** - -
(-2.6651) (-2.7918)
B2 0.0488 0.0385 - -
(1.3153) (1.0082)
A*B -0.1083** -0.1017** - -
(2.6819) (-2.4916)
Inefficiency model (Characteristics)
Constant -4.7219** -4.7360** -1.5401** -1.9231**
(-4.2076) (-5.0769) (-3.2867) (-4.3698)
Urban county 0.9417** 0.8531** 0.4833** 0.5640**
(2.2227) (2.4620) (3.0287) (3.4295)
Unemployment rate 0.0322 0.0018 0.0359** 0.0260**
(1.0375) (0.0573) (3.1544) (2.2826)
Population density -0.0213 -0.0364* -0.0152 -0.0296**
(-0.9785) (-1.6933) (-1.2673) (-2.5379)
Population, 1000 0.0025 0.0068** 0.0017 0.0044**
(0.9104) (3.2438) (1.5959) (5.8578)
Population, squared -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000**
(-2.0203) (-4.1837) (-3.5822) (-6.8122)
Rurality -0.0078 -0.0235 -0.0003 -0.0018
(-0.2405) (-0.8356) (-0.0191) (-0.1058)
Accommodation facilities 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0007** 0.0007**
(4.5316) (4.0033) (8.2450) (7.7510)
Kilometres travelled on 0.0001** - 0.0001** -
county roads per year (2.9242) (4.0984)
Maximum geographical -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0010** -0.0011**
point of county (-5.5501) (-5.6848) (-7.4878) (-7.9423)
Inefficiency model (Determinants)
Disposable income 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0002** 0.0002**
(4.9534) (6.1223) (7.0494) (8.5207)
Payments to counties 0.0012** 0.0014** 0.0009 0.0011*
(2.2507) (2.7656) (1.6353) (1.9048)
Grants for county roads 0.0204** 0.0205** 0.0039* 0.0063**
(3.4508) (4.2292) (1.8375) (3.0057)
Herfindahl index 0.0985 -0.5282 0.8959* 0.6413
(0.1065) (-0.5907) (1.9191) (1.3398)
Share of left -0.0124 -0.0135 0.0062* 0.0051
(-1.2819) (-1.3219) (1.8495) (1.5357)
Sigma-squared (σˆ2) 0.2121** 0.2089** - -
(10.1179) (10.4461)
Gamma (γ) 0.6360** 0.6327** - -
(14.9942) (13.2922)
Log-likelihood -223.47 -228.42 - -
Adjusted R2 - - 0.45 0.44
Note: N = 660. Dependent variable of (1) and (2): total expenditures for county roads; dependent variable of (3)
and (4): efficiency scores obtained from the stochastic frontier regression of total expenditures for county roads on
the output variables (for the results see Appendix B). All specifications include time fixed effects. (Robust) t-values
are given in parentheses. ** (*) denotes significance at the 5% (10%) level.
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Table 5: Determinants of the counties’ efficiency in road maintenance (non-parametric
approach)
Variable Tobit Truncated Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Characteristics
Constant 2.1324** 2.2508** 1.5066** 1.0259**
(6.9752) (7.5084) (5.2927) (4.0725)
Urban county 0.4797** 0.4559** -0.2699** -0.4243**
(5.7538) (5.5268) (-3.5922) (-7.2205)
Unemployment rate -0.0097 -0.0068 0.0167** 0.0127*
(-1.3481) (-0.9704) (2.4348) (1.8666)
Population density -0.0281** -0.0238** 0.0020 0.0117**
(-4.6153) (-4.2338) (0.3664) (3.0304)
Population, 1000 -0.0000 -0.0009* -0.0021** -
(-0.0679) (-1.7905) (-3.5108)
Population, squared 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000** -
(1.4735) (3.0055) (3.7516)
Rurality 0.0277** 0.0281** 0.0011 0.0064
(3.3865) (3.4389) (0.1495) (0.9039)
Accommodation facilities -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0000 -0.0001
(-3.9319) (-3.8892) (-0.4041) (-0.6503)
Kilometres travelled on -0.0000* - 0.0000 -0.0000
county roads per year (-1.8300) (1.5929) (-0.6727)
Maximum geographical 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0002**
point of county (1.6043) (1.9135) (2.9096) (2.8969)
Determinants
Disposable income -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0000**
(-5.7411) (-6.6078) (-3.9483) (-3.5872)
Payments to counties -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-1.1289) (-1.3859) (-0.8602) (-0.5370)
Grants for county roads -0.0050** -0.0058** -0.0084** -0.0072**
(-3.4220) (-4.0624) (6.3586) (-6.0786)
Herfindahl index -0.3562 -0.2849 0.0034 0.3704
(-1.0632) (-0.8543) (0.0108) (1.1681)
Share of left -0.0093** -0.0090** -0.0041* -0.0058**
(-3.9676) (-3.8356) (-1.8931) (-2.6891)
σˆ 0.2486** 0.2492** 0.3099** 0.3128**
(31.1859) (31.1815) (58.8598) (59.4877)
Log-likelihood -143.42 -145.09 -70.82 -81.65
Adjusted Pseudo-R2 0.30 0.30 - -
Note: N = 660. Dependent variable: efficiency indices obtained using DEA. All specifications include time fixed
effects. t-values are given in parentheses. The efficiency indices and t-values of specification (3) and (4) are corrected
by the bootstrap procedure (“algorithm 2”) proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) (see also subsection 2.2). ** (*)
denotes significance at the 5% (10%) level.
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once the variable “kilometres travelled on county roads” is removed from the model (see
specifications (2) and (4) of table 4 and specifications (2) of table 5). This could be due
to the fact that the kilometres travelled are a substitute for total population.22 Third, the
influence of population density on costs is not clear; indeed, three of the four specifications
hint at cost advantages form agglomeration economies (see table 4 and specifications (3)
and (4) of table 5), the significance of the coefficients among the specifications is, however,
not very robust. Fourth, the coefficient of the index of rurality shows the desired sign in
all four specifications, the coefficients are, however, only statistically significant in the Tobit
regression of table 5.
Fifth, an increasing number of accommodation facilities is accompanied by rising costs;
this effect is (mostly) highly statistically significant and supports the hypothesis of Sampaio
De Sousa and Stosic (2005) and Kalb (2008) that touristic regions have a greater demand
for high-cost or high-quality services. Sixth, concerning the unemployment rate, three of
the four specifications show a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and
costs; only the truncated regression in table 5 points to the inverse relationship. Therefore,
we carefully conclude that the cost effect (i.e. higher spending for unemployment benefits)
outweighs the preference effect (i.e. lower demand for high-quality public services). Finally,
the maximum geographical point of the counties which accounts for the geographical location
of the counties has - contrary to our predictions in subsection 4.2 - a positive impact on costs.
One explanation for this (surprising) result could be the fact that this variable approximates
the differences in road construction and maintenance between rural and urban areas (rather
than just the geographical location of the counties), because (more densely populated) urban
areas are more often located in flat regions. Since in urban areas bypasses (i.e. highways
that redirect traffic around urban areas) are more often needed than in (hilly) rural areas,
and since bypasses often include the construction and maintenance of expensive bridges and
tunnels, the expenditures for (county) roads are much higher in urban areas.
Furthermore, concerning the determinants of technical efficiency, which are of main interest
in this study, we first find that the disposable income of the citizens significantly reduces
(technical) efficiency in all four specifications. This (very) robust result is in accordance with
the findings of De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) and strongly supports the hypotheses that
(1) higher income levels foster potential inefficiencies, since they increase the fiscal capacity
of the counties, and (2) the monitoring activities of high-income citizens are (comparatively)
lower since opportunity costs are higher.
Second, the payments to the counties have - contrary to our predictions - a negative,
22Note that in the truncated regression of table 5, total population (along with its squared term) was
removed to get a negative coefficient (which, however, is insignificant) for the kilometres travelled on
county roads.
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and in the parametric approach (see table 4) also a (highly) significant impact on technical
efficiency. One of the arguments brought forward for a positive relationship between the
payments to the counties and (technical) efficiency in subsection 4.2 was that higher tax
burdens increase the awareness of the local jurisdictions’ citizens how public funds are used
and therefore also increase monitoring activities. Since the (rural) counties consist of different
municipalities which, in turn, levy own taxes (e.g. trade and property tax), the populace
of the different municipalities may be more intent on monitoring the incumbents of their
own municipalities (than those of the counties) because they may think that other citizens
of other municipalities (belonging to the same county) will monitor the incumbents of the
counties. In other words, the monitoring mechanism on the county level may fail. This,
however, increases the possibilities for the counties’ incumbents to rise budgetary slack (or
inefficiency). Third, table 4 and 5 show that the grants for the county roads reduce (technical)
efficiency. Moreover, this effect is highly statistically significant in all four specifications.
This (very) robust result is in accordance with the findings of Silkman and Young (1982)
and Kalb (2008) and supports the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants stimulate the
incentives of the local jurisdictions’ incumbents to extend budgetary slack.
Finally, turning to the political variables, we find that the impact of the Herfindahl index
- measuring the political concentration or monopolisation of the county council - on (tech-
nical) efficiency is unclear. While the Tobit regression and the two-step approach hint at a
negative relationship between political concentration and efficiency, the truncated regression
point to the inverse relationship; the two specifications of the one-step approach even yield
different results. Moreover, almost all coefficients are insignificant. Therefore, we find no
clear evidence for the hypothesis, that (technical) efficiency increases with political monop-
olisation in the local council (set up in subsection 4.2). Concerning the ideology measure
(“share of left”), three of the four specifications show a negative and statistically significant
relationship between the share of the left-wing parties in the county council and (technical)
efficiency. Only the one-step approach of Battese and Coelli (1995) in table 5 points to the
inverse relationship; the coefficients are, however, insignificant. Therefore, we carefully con-
clude that local governments with a higher share of left-wing parties seems to be associated
with higher inefficiency.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the determinants of local government efficiency for the case of
local road maintenance for a panel of German counties using a broad variety of estimation
approaches. For this purpose we calculate efficiency indices using non-parametric (DEA)
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and parametric (stochastic frontier analysis) reference technologies, and examine how these
efficiency indices can be explained by a number of exogenous (e.g. socio-economic, fiscal,
political) variables. More specifically, we apply and compare four different estimation ap-
proaches to detect the potential sources of (in)efficiency: In case of the efficiency estimates
obtained by stochastic frontier analysis we apply (1) the two-step approach and (2) the one-
step approach proposed Battese and Coelli (1995); the DEA-based efficiency estimates are
analysed (3) in a second-step Tobit regression as well as (4) in a truncated regression where
the t-values are corrected by the bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).
The results of the analysis can be summarised as follows: The disposable income of the
counties’ citizens, intergovernmental grants (for county roads), and the payments to the
counties were estimated to influence (technical) efficiency negatively. Concerning political
variables we found weak evidence that (technical) efficiency decreases with an increasing
share of seats of left-wing parties in the county council; on the other hand, the hypothesis that
(technical) efficiency decreases with the degree of political concentration in the county council
could not be confirmed. In addition, concerning the characteristics of the counties, we show
that costs increase with population size, the kilometres travelled on county roads per year
(accounting for the volume of traffic on the county roads), and the number of accommodation
facilities (approximating the degree of the regions’ tourism), whereas the effect of population
density is ambiguous across the different estimation specifications. Moreover, we found weak
evidence for a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and costs. Finally, costs
decrease with the degree of rurality of the counties as well as the maximum geographical
point of the county (accounting for the geographical location of the counties).
Furthermore, the analysis shows, that not all of the four estimation approaches (mentioned
above) are consistent - concerning the sign of the coefficients as well as the (statistical) sig-
nificance. Therefore, focusing on just one estimation method (e.g. DEA + Tobit regression),
as it was done in the most previous studies investigating the determinants of local govern-
ments’ technical efficiency, may be deceptive. To test the robustness of the results, different
estimation approaches should be applied and compared. In addition, useful policy implica-
tions can be drawn from this analysis. Firstly, the negative relationship between the grants
and technical efficiency points out that the arrangement of the intergovernmental grants is
important with regard to efficiency considerations. As put forward by Silkman and Young
(1982), this may suggest the need “to include explicit productivity clauses and performance
incentives [in grant-in-aid formulas] which link efficiency or productivity with the levels of
payments”(p. 395). On the other hand, Kalb (2008) suggests that local governments should
be given more autonomy in raising their own revenue, since this could reduce fiscal illusion
(which may be one source of technical inefficiency). Secondly, as mentioned in subsection
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4.3, the negative relationship between the payments to the counties and technical efficiency
suggests that there is a failure in the monitoring mechanism (of the citizens) on the county
level. Similar to the intergovernmental grants, proxies for the efficiency of the counties could
be incorporated into the design mechanism of the payments to the counties to minimise
potential inefficiencies.
Finally, it should be noted that some of the explanatory variables used in this analysis
may suffer from an endogeneity bias or, more specifically, from reverse causality. Of course,
a suitable technique to overcome this problem would be the usage of instrumental variable
(IV) estimation techniques. However, the methods employed here do not allow to introduce
such an estimation approach; certainly, it would be interesting to redo this analysis with an
instrumental variable estimation technique. In addition, it should be kept in mind that, de-
spite of the usage of a specific (namely road maintenance) rather than a global approach, the
output and input indicators are only proxies of the “real” outputs and inputs. Nevertheless,
the usage of a specific rather than a global approach considerably reduces potential sources
of measurement errors (in the inputs and outputs). To further minimise potential sources of
error, the determinants of technical efficiency may be analysed not only for one particular
area of local public good provision (like road maintenance) but simultaneously for different
areas like waste collection, administration, and so on. A high degree of consistency in the
results of the different models (e.g. in the signs of the explanatory variables) then points to
robust results. But this is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Definitions
The dataset used in all estimation approaches consists of 35 rural and 9 urban counties
of the German state Baden-Wu¨rttemberg for the period 1990 to 2004. All variables ex-
cept of the variables “area of county roads”, “maximum geographical point of county”,
and “rurality” come from the Statistical Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (Statistisches Lan-
desamt Baden-Wu¨rttemberg). The area of the county roads is obtained from the State Office
for Street Engineering (Landesstelle fu¨r Straßentechnik Baden-Wu¨rttemberg), the maximum
geographical points of the counties by the State Surveying Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(Landesvermessungsamt Baden-Wu¨rttemberg), and the index of rurality by the Federal Of-
fice for Building and Regional Planning (Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung).
Total expenditures, county roads: These include all expenditures spent on county roads
by the counties. According to the street law (Straßengesetz Baden-Wu¨rttemberg), however,
in municipalities with more than 30.000 inhabitants the cross-town links that are classified
as county roads have to be financed by the municipalities and not by the counties (art. 43,
para. 3). Moreover, all other municipalities have to finance the pavements and the parking
spaces of cross-town links which are classified as county roads (art. 43, para. 4). Finally,
county roads can sometimes be financed by third parties (e.g. administration unions), too
(art. 45, para. 2). We deal with this problem by adding all the money spent on county roads
by municipalities and third parties to the expenditures of the respective county. Formally,
total expenditures (exp) for county roads (cr) are then given by (dropping time subscripts
and subscripts for the counties):
exptotal, cr = expcounties, cr + expmunicipalities, cr + expthird parties, cr.
Area of county roads: The area of the county roads is calculated by multiplying the
length and the (average) width of the county roads (separated into cross-town links and roads
outside of built-up areas), whereas the width includes the traffic lanes and hard shoulders.
Cycle tracks and pavements are not contained in the width. Unfortunately, only the width of
the county roads in 1996 was available. Therefore we used the width of 1996 to approximate
the width of the roads for the other years.23 Formally, the area of the county roads is then
calculated as follows:
areacounty roadsi,t = total length
county roads
i,t ∗ widthcounty roadsi,1996 ,
23Since the width of the county roads changed only marginally in recent years, this is a minor problem.
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where i is the subscript for the counties and t is the time subscript.
Average (weighted) kilometres travelled on county roads per year: This indicator
is composed of the kilometres travelled on county roads by (1) motorcycles, (2) cars, (3)
trucks with a maximum total weight of (i) below 12 tons, and (ii) above 12 tons. Since
the roads’ rate of wear varies (substantially) between the four types of vehicles, every of
the above mentioned categories is weighted differently. More specifically, we weighted the
kilometres travelled of the four types of vehicles by the cost per kilometre caused by the
respective type of vehicle (Wegekosten) calculated by Doll et al. (2002).24 Then, the average
weighted kilometres travelled on county roads (AWKT) are calculated as follows (dropping
time subscripts and subscripts for the counties):
AWKT =
AWKTmc + 2 ∗ AWKTcar + 2.5 ∗ AWKTtrucks<12t + 15 ∗ AWKTtrucks>12t∑4
j=1wj
,
where w represents the weights of the four types of vehicles.
Index of rurality: The three different types of counties are defined as follows:
Type 1: Agglomeration areas
1 Urban counties with more than 100.000 inhabitants
2 Counties with at least 300 inhabitants per square kilometre
3 Counties with at least 150 inhabitants per square kilometre
4 Counties with less than 150 inhabitants per square kilometre
Type 2: Urbanised areas
5 Urban counties with more then 100.000 inhabitants
6 Counties with at least 150 inhabitants per square kilometre
7 Counties with less than 150 inhabitants per square kilometre
Type 3: Rural areas
8 Counties with at least 100 inhabitants per square kilometre
9 Counties with less than 100 inhabitants per square kilometre
Note that type I areas are defined as regions with more than 300.000 inhabitants or with
300 inhabitants per square kilometre. In contrast, type II areas are regions with more than
150 inhabitants per square kilometre or with at least 100.000 inhabitants and 100 inhabi-
24Doll et al. (2002) calculate costs of 0.02e/kilometre for motorcycles, of 0.04e/kilometre for cars, of
0.05e/kilometre (0.30e/kilometre) for trucks with a maximum total weight of below (above) 12 tons
for federal highways in Germany (in 2003).
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tants per square kilometre. The remaining regions are type III areas. The main difference
between type III and type II areas is that the latter have a higher degree of urbanisation
and a rudimental metropolitan centre.
Herfindahl index: The Herfindahl index (HI) is calculated by multiplying the squared seat
shares (s) of the main national parties (from right to left: CDU, FDP, SPD, GRUENE) and
of the “free voters unions” (fvu) in the county council:
HI = s2CDU + s
2
SPD + s
2
FDP + s
2
GRUENE + s
2
fvu.
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Appendix B
Table B1: Results of the first stage frontier estimation
Variable
Constant 8.1160**
(8.2819)
A: Area of county roads, log 1.7123**
(5.3731)
B: Number of accidents due to -0.0170
bad road conditions, log (-0.0589)
A2 -0.0224
(-0.6629)
B2 0.0732**
(1.9690)
A*B -0.1213**
(-2.9633)
Log-likelihood -234.89
Note: N = 660. Dependent variable: total expenditures for county roads. t-values are given in parentheses. ** (*)
denotes significance at 5% (10%) level.
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